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Two things differentiate a surveillance state from a non-surveillance 
state: the ease of government access to personal data and the strength of a 
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country’s human rights legal framework. Both are being profoundly altered 
by recent transnational legal efforts, collectively called mutual legal 
assistance (MLA) treaty (MLAT) reform, aimed at facilitating cross-border 
data access for law enforcement. MLATs enable law enforcement agencies 
to obtain evidence located in foreign countries, including personal data and 
other electronic evidence.1 Reform efforts are necessitated by the failure of 
slow and complex traditional MLA procedures to meet growing law 
enforcement demands, as well as uncertainty about jurisdiction over data 
results in international disputes. However, in the rush to mollify law 
enforcement agencies, and the attention demanded by complex procedural 
and jurisdictional issues, human rights protections tend to be an 
afterthought. If this continues, governments may unwittingly produce the 
conditions that give rise to surveillance states all over the world. 
The desire to reduce legal complications associated with cross-border 
data access is understandable. A criminal investigator in country A, for 
example, may need access to the content of an e-mail sent by one of its 
nationals via Google’s Gmail, but may wait for months, while the request 
percolates through the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the United States 
(U.S.) federal court system. Governments in country A and the U.S. may 
disagree over which has jurisdiction over the data—country A may have 
jurisdiction over the suspect and location of the crime, while the data may 
be held by a U.S. company subject to U.S. jurisdiction. This may be all the 
more complicated when the data is stored on a server in country B, which 
may argue that the data’s physical presence in its territory gives neither 
country A nor the U.S. jurisdiction over it.  
Some states respond by empowering themselves to circumvent the 
MLA process with problematic new domestic policies. One tactic is 
mandated data localization, which forces service providers to store user 
data on servers within a state’s territory. This undermines Internet and web 
openness, which is crucial to its functioning. Another tactic is for a 
government to grant itself the legal authority to demand access to data 
regardless of where the data are stored. This arguably undermines the 
principle of state sovereignty.  
MLAT reform is necessary to disincentivize these problematic 
unilateral measures, reinforce state sovereignty, and remove barriers to 
effective law enforcement. Yet, to varying degrees, recently proposed and 
enacted measures, including the U.S. Clarifying Lawful Use of Overseas 
Data (CLOUD) Act, the European Union’s (EU) e-Evidence proposal, and 
the potential Second Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe’s 
Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention), would expedite access 
at the expense of legal norms protecting state sovereignty and procedures 
designed to protect personal data, privacy, and other human rights 
interests.2 Only one proposal, a draft legal instrument for an International 
 
 
1 See generally, Mailyn Fidler, MLAT Reform: Some Thoughts from Civil Society, LAWFARE 
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.lawfareblog.com/mlat-reform-some-thoughts-civil-society; Greg 
Nojeim, MLAT Reform: A Straw Man Proposal, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://cdt.org/files/2015/09/2015-09-03-MLAT-Reform-Post_Final-1.pdf; Arthur Rizer & Anne 
Hobson, Cross-Border Data Requests: Evaluating Reforms to Improve Law Enforcement Access, 
RSTREET (Nov. 2017), http://2o9ub0417chl2lg6m43em6psi2i.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/11/120.pdf.  
2 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018). This 
Act is also known as the CLOUD Act. The two elements of the e-Evidence proposal are a 
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Data Access Warrant, introduced by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the 
right to privacy, adequately addresses human rights issues, wait-times for 
law enforcement, and state sovereignty.3  
While MLAT reform revolves around a set of relatively technical and 
esoteric legal issues, policymakers must not lose sight of the potentially 
Orwellian impact that poorly-designed MLAT reform could have on 
human rights and democratic institutions. Any long-term solution must 
compensate for lost legal protections to ensure that expanded government 
data collection powers are not abused.  
 
 
I. THERE IS A LEGITIMATE AND PRESSING NEED FOR MLAT REFORM 
 
A. THE U.S. MLA PROCESS IS TOO SLOW AND INEFFICIENT 
 
MLA processes in the U.S., where most computer records are 
requested, are too slow and inefficient to meet foreign law enforcement 
demands.4 MLA requests for data held by U.S. companies typically entail 
months-long wait-times, impeding law enforcement efforts all over the 
world.  
Foreign governments utilize the U.S. MLA process to obtain warrants 
and court orders necessary to access data controlled by U.S. tech 
companies.5 The Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) 
generally prohibits a U.S. company from providing communications 
content to a foreign government outside of the MLA process.6 While 
companies are free to disclose non-content data, they often refrain from 
doing so, necessitating use of the MLA process.7  
The U.S. MLA process is complex. To obtain a U.S. warrant or court 
order, a foreign law enforcement agency must first seek approval from a 
specialized domestic “central authority.”8 If approved, the request is sent to 
                                                                                                           
and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters. Proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on European Production and Preservation Orders 
for Electronic Evidence in Criminal Matters, COM (2018) 225 final (Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter 
Draft Regulation]; Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Laying 
Down Harmonised Rules on the Appointment of Legal Representatives for the Purpose of 
Gathering Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, COM (2018) 226 final (Apr. 4, 2018) [hereinafter 
Draft Directive]; Council of Europe, Terms of Reference for the Preparation of a Draft 2nd 
Additional Protocol to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, CYBERCRIME CONVENTION 
COMM. (June 9, 2017), https://rm.coe.int/terms-of-reference-for-the-preparation-of-a-draft-2nd-
additional-proto/168072362b [hereinafter Terms of Reference]; Convention on Cybercrime 
(Budapest Convention), Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185 [hereinafter Budapest Convention]; Joseph A. 
Cannataci (United Nations (U.N.) Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy), Working Draft 
Legal Instrument on Government-led Surveillance and Privacy, Version 0.7 (Feb. 28, 2018), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Privacy/SR_Privacy/2018AnnualReportAppendix7.pdf 
[hereinafter Draft Legal Instrument].  
3 Draft Legal Instrument, supra note 2.  
4 Council of Europe, T-CY Assessment Report: The Mutual Legal Assistance Provisions of the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMM. 61–81 (Dec. 3, 2014), 
https://rm.coe.int/16802e726c [hereinafter T-CY Assessment Report]. 
5 See generally STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45173, CROSS-BORDER 
DATA SHARING UNDER THE CLOUD ACT 12–14 (2018). 
6 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (2018).  
7 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6); Commission Staff Working Doc. Impact Assessment, at 27, SWD 
(2018) 118 final (Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Impact Assessment].  
8 TIFFANY LIN & MAILYN FIDLER, BERKMAN KLEIN CTR., CROSS-BORDER DATA ACCESS 
REFORM: A PRIMER ON THE PROPOSED U.S.-U.K. AGREEMENT 2–3 (2017); DEP’T OF JUST. CRIM. 
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the DOJ’s Office of International Affairs (OIA), the U.S. central authority, 
which determines whether it meets U.S. legal requirements, such as 
whether the factual basis for suspicion amounts to probable cause.9 Once 
satisfied, OIA sends the request to a U.S. Attorney’s Office, which brings 
the case before a federal magistrate judge.10 If the judge approves the 
request, he or she issues a warrant or order to the relevant company.11 The 
company then sends the data to OIA, which determines whether it meets 
data minimization and human rights requirements.12 OIA then sends the 
data to the foreign government’s central authority, which supplies it to the 
law enforcement agency.13  
In addition to the complexity of this process, OIA’s workload 
contributes to slow response times. Annual MLA requests for computer 
records increased by over 1,000% between the years 2000 and 2014.14 
Response times were roughly six to twenty-three months in 2014.15 In the 
2016 fiscal year, there was an MLA request backlog, including non-
computer record requests, of 13,421 cases, though this has been reduced to 
9,038 as a result of a one-off budget increase for additional staff.16 
Currently, EU member states typically wait between one and six months 
for access.17  
Non-content data may be obtained directly from U.S. companies, 
outside of the MLA process. An exception in ECPA permits companies to 
disclose non-content data to foreign governments at their discretion.18 
Despite receiving many more requests than OIA, U.S. companies comply 
with requests far more quickly. For example, EU member states sent 
around 120,000 requests to Google, Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, and 
Twitter in 2016, with a typical response time of around eleven to thirty 
days.19  
This discrepancy—a wait-time of eleven to thirty days for direct 
requests on the one hand, and a wait-time of one to six months for MLA 
requests, on the other—frustrates foreign governments and undermines 
their criminal justice systems.20  
 
 
9 LIN & FIDLER, supra note 8, at 2.  
10 Id. (though OIA may request data in a federal court without the assistance of a U.S. 
Attorney, it often lacks the resources to do so); 18. U.S.C. § 3512 (1995); 2016 BUDGET, supra 
note 8, at 24. 
11 LIN & FIDLER, supra note 8, at 2. 
12 Id. at 3. 
13 Id. 
14 2016 BUDGET, supra note 8, at 22–23.  
15 T-CY Assessment Report, supra note 4, at 123 (describing a survey of thirty-six parties and 
three observer states). 
16 2016 BUDGET, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that seventy-seven additional attorneys and 
paralegals were requested to be hired with the one-off budget increase of $32,111,000).  
17 Impact Assessment, supra note 7, 263–64 (describing self-reported wait times, as measured 
by the mode, for access to content and non-content data through non-EU government authorities; 
the numbers mainly reflect United States’ requests).  
18 18 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(6) (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2711 (prohibiting disclosure to governmental 
entities, which means only U.S. governmental entities); Impact Assessment, supra note 7, at 14 
(discussing how non-content data is the most commonly sought category of data). Most state 
parties to the Budapest Convention do not permit service providers to voluntarily disclose non-
content data.  
19 Impact Assessment, supra note 7, at 194 (While this figure is calculated with both U.S. and 
non-U.S. service provider response times, the number largely reflects U.S. companies, as they 
receive the majority of requests.).  
20 Id.; see also Andrew K. Woods, Interview: The British Perspective on the Cross-Border 












B. UNILATERAL MEASURES 
 
Unsurprisingly, governments have begun to circumvent the U.S. MLA 
process. Some now require service providers to store data within their 
respective jurisdictions, rendering the MLA process irrelevant, while 
others have given themselves authority through domestic law to demand 
the production of data stored anywhere.  
Data localization is one policy response to slow MLA processes.21 
Germany and Russia, for example, require companies to store at least some 
categories of personal data on servers located within state boundaries.22 
While data localization allays more immediate concerns about response 
times, it also generates more consequential problems. First, data 
localization undermines Internet and web openness.23 The imposition of 
territorial borders restricts a company’s ability to manage data traffic in 
ways that enhance efficiency, security, and interoperability.24 Second, data 
localization can be used as a pretext for more aggressive surveillance and 
censorship.25  
Another policy response, the use of domestic law to empower law 
enforcement authorities or courts to demand its nationals’ data regardless 
of where the data is stored, poses its own problems. While the argument 
that jurisdiction over data should not be determined by physical location 
may be sound, it lacks international consensus.26 Absent this consensus, 
 
 
21 See, e.g., Jonah F. Hill and Matthew Noyes, Rethinking Data, Geography, and Jurisdiction: 
Towards a Common Framework for Harmonizing Global Data Flow Controls, NEW AM. (2018), 
https://www.newamerica.org/documents/2084/Rethinking_Data_Geography_Jurisdiction_2.21.pdf
; Peter Swire, Why Cross-Border Government Requests for Data Will Keep Becoming More 
Important, LAWFARE (May 23, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/why-cross-border-
government-requests-data-will-keep-becoming-more-important.  
22 See Gesetz zur Einführung einer Speicherpflicht und einer Höchstspeicherfrist für Verkehrsdaten, 
published Dec. 10, 2015, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BUNDES GBL] (Ger.) (Law on the Introduction of a 
Storage Obligation and a Maximum Storage Period for Traffic Data) [translated]; Personal Data of 




23 Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Breaking the Web: Data Localization vs. the Global 
Internet, CA. INT’L L. CTR. 1, 4 (“By creating national barriers to data, data localization measures 
break up the World Wide Web, which was designed to share information across the globe. The 
Internet is a global network based on a protocol for interconnecting computers without regard for 
national borders. Information is routed across this network through decisions made autonomously 
and automatically at local routers, which choose paths based largely on efficiency, unaware of 
political borders. Thus, the services built on the Internet, from email to the World Wide Web, pay 
little heed to national borders. Services such as cloud computing exemplify this, making largely 
invisible to users the physical locations for the storage and processing of their data. Data 
localization would dramatically alter this fundamental architecture of the Internet.”).  
24 See generally Erica Fraser, Data Localisation and The Balkanisation of the Internet, 13 
SCRIPTED 359, 363 (2016), https://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/13-3-fraser.pdf; 
Dillon Reisman, Where Is Your Data, Really?: The Technical Case Against Data Localization, 
LAWFARE (May 22, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/where-your-data-really-technical-case-
against-data-localization. 
25 See, e.g., Adam Taylor, Russia Moves to Block Professional Networking Site LinkedIn, WASH. 
POST (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/17/russia-
moves-to-block-professional-networking-site-linkedin/?utm_term=.10f8ce92e2a6 (“The aim of this law 
is to create . . . (another) quasi-legal pretext to close Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and all other services . . 
. The aim is surveillance, obviously—to make servers of the companies accessible to the Russian 
national system of online surveillance . . . and also to get the Internet giants effectively landed in Russia.” 
(citations omitted)).  
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direct access to cross-border data will generate confusion and international 
discord following real or perceived violations of state sovereignty.27  
 
C. SOVEREIGNTY AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
 
The mismatch between the traditional territorial conception of state 
sovereignty in international law, and the non-territorial nature of the web 
and Internet, results in uncertainty and disagreements about which state has 
jurisdiction over sought-after data.  
Generally, a state has exclusive jurisdiction in law enforcement 
matters within its territorial borders.28 The government of one state may 
not exercise its law enforcement powers within the territory of another 
state absent the second state’s permission.29 Absent permission, if one state 
compels an entity to hand over data stored in another state for a law 
enforcement investigation in the first state, it would arguably be an 
impermissible exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction.30  
In contrast, the Internet and web are generally non-territorial.31 The 
data storage practices of tech companies tend not to follow jurisdictional 
boundaries. Not only are data stored in multiple jurisdictions, but their 
locations shift over time, and they can be duplicated or split into 
fragments.32 Decisions about which server(s) will host a user’s data depend 
on the user’s location, the type of data, and cost considerations, among 
other things.33 Given that data sought in investigations are stored in a 
dynamic, borderless way, states may disagree over which has jurisdiction 
over the data and authority to compel their disclosure.34 Confusion about 
jurisdiction may cause one state to unwittingly violate the sovereignty of 
another.35  
When the U.S. government demanded that Microsoft hand over data 
stored in Ireland outside of the MLA process, Microsoft argued that this 
would be “the same as if U.S. agents bearing a warrant directed Hilton to 
send a housekeeper into a hotel room in Dublin, photograph a guest’s 
papers, and email the copies to Washington. It is the execution of a search 
 
 
27 Brief for Respondent at 4, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. 1186 (2018) (No. 14-
2985) (arguing that “the presumption against extraterritoriality . . . ensures that courts do not 
trigger international discord—like the outcry that the Government’s order to Microsoft has 
prompted from foreign leaders around the world.”).  
28 HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 212–13 (2003). 
29 Id. at 212 (stating that, “coercive acts . . . must not be executed on the territory of another 
state without the latter’s consent. Without such consent they constitute a violation of international 
law.”).  
30 See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 27, at 37–44 (arguing that the “international 
discord that has erupted, and the potential for conflict with foreign laws, confirm that the warrant 
entails an impermissible extraterritorial application of the [Stored Communications Act, a portion 
of ECPA].”). 
31 See generally Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L. REV. 317, 336 
(2015) (discussing how a sovereignty-based model of internet governance “would be legally 
simple, but so far, it is not descriptively accurate. States appear generally unable to secure their 
cyber borders like they secure their physical territory. There is basically one global Internet, not 
individual national internets. Imposing a sovereignty-based model for cyberspace would thus mark 
a major change from the status quo and would fundamentally after the domain being governed.”); 
Internet Invariants: What Really Matters, INTERNET SOC. (Feb. 3, 2012), 
https://www.internetsociety.org/internet-invariants-what-really-matters/; Reisman, supra note 24.  
32 Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 365–78 (2015); 
Reisman, supra note 24.   
33 Daskal, supra note 32; Fraser, supra note 24, at 362–68. 
34 Reisman, supra note 24. 
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warrant in a place outside the United States.”36 The resulting court 
challenge drew attention to the fact that Microsoft—like other private 
companies—is routinely forced to be the arbiter of fundamental principles 
of international law, conflicts of law concerning fundamental rights, and 
strong political pressure.37 Given that Microsoft is a private company, this 
is not ideal.  
Thus, there is a pressing need for MLAT reform. Yet most proposals 
are problematic, because they streamline access by weakening legal 
safeguards against abuse.  
 
 
II. MLAT REFORM IS NEVERTHELESS CONCERNING 
 
 
Despite the need for MLAT reform, most proposals are concerning 
because they accelerate data access by eliminating or paring down 
procedural protections for online privacy, data protection, and other 
fundamental rights. The resulting legal frameworks may be inconsistent 
with states’ obligations under international human rights law and increase 
the risk of abuses.  
 
A. STATES’ INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN CROSS-BORDER DATA ACCESS 
 
Longstanding principles governing the right to privacy, combined with 
emerging standards applicable to contemporary electronic privacy and data 
protection, limit government discretion to collect personal data for law 
enforcement purposes.38 Government interference with privacy or data 
protection rights must, first, be necessary to achieve a legitimate aim.39 
Second, the interference must be proportionate to that aim, in that it 
appropriately balances the state’s interest in obtaining data with the 
seriousness of the interference with the subject’s privacy and data 
protection rights.40 Third, the interference must be in accordance with the 
law, meaning it has a basis in domestic law that is both compatible with the 
rule of law generally and is also sufficiently detailed for its consequences 
to be foreseeable.41 
Fourth, the interference must be accompanied by adequate safeguards 
to prevent arbitrary or abusive practices.42 Legal instruments governing 
data collection and other surveillance methods must describe the nature of 
offenses that may justify surveillance; define the categories of people who 
may be surveilled; limit the duration of surveillance; and describe 
 
 
36 Id. at 33. 
37 Id. 
38 See generally Case of Roman Zakharov v. Russia (Application no. 47143/06), HUDOC 
(2015), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159324 [hereinafter Zakharov v. Russia]; Joined cases 
C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen, Sec’y of State for Home Dep’t 
v. Watson, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 970, at ¶¶ 94–96, 103–12 (Dec. 21, 2016); Human 
Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014) 
[hereinafter The Right to Privacy]; Human Rights Council, The Right to Privacy in the Digital 
Age: Advance Edited Version, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/39/1 (Aug. 3, 2018) [hereinafter The Right to 
Privacy: Advanced]. 
39 See The Right to Privacy: Advanced, supra note 38. 
40 Id.  
41 Id.  
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procedures for examining, using, and storing data obtained, precautions for 
sharing data with other parties, and the circumstances in which data must 
or may be destroyed. 43  
Fifth, the interference must be subject to adequate oversight.44 
Oversight may take place before, during, or after data collection.45 It must 
be effective.46 For example, oversight authorities must have access to all 
relevant information and have the power to terminate breaches of 
applicable rules.47 It must also be continuous, subject to public scrutiny, 
and not give rise to conflicts of interest.48 Conflicts of interest are 
especially likely to arise where there is an inadequate separation of powers; 
for example, when prosecutors are tasked with both authorizing 
surveillance and prosecuting cases based on this evidence.49  
Ideally, oversight includes prior merits-based judicial authorization. In 
comparison to the executive and legislative branches, the judiciary is best-
positioned to provide independent, impartial, and procedurally proper 
decisions about the necessity and proportionality of interferences with 
fundamental rights.50 According to the Council of Europe’s Venice 
Commission, as quoted by the European Court of Human Rights,  
 
there is an obvious advantage of requiring prior judicial 
authorization for special investigative techniques, namely that 
the security agency has to go ‘outside of itself’ and convince 
an independent person of the need for a particular measure. It 
subordinates security concerns to the law, and as such it 
serves to institutionalize respect for the law. If it works 
properly, judicial authorization will have a preventive effect, 
deterring unmeritorious applications and/or cutting down the 
duration of a special investigative measure.51 
 
Additionally, an authorizing body must verify that there is a sufficient 
factual showing to support a “reasonable suspicion” against the target to 
justify surveillance.52 Bodies in other branches of government may be 
 
 
43 The Right to Privacy, supra note 38, at ¶ 28. 
44 Id.; The Right to Privacy: Advanced, supra note 38; Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at 
¶¶ 233–34.  
45 Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 233 
46 Id. at ¶¶ 275, 281–82.  
47 Id. at ¶ 282.  
48 Id. at ¶¶ 230, 275, 281–83.  
49 Id. at ¶ 230. 
50 Id. at ¶¶ 233, 257, 275; Case of Szabó and Vissy v. Hungary (Application no. 37138/14), 
HUDOC at ¶ 79 (2016), https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng - 
{"fulltext":["vissy"],"documentcollectionid2":["GRANDCHAMBER","CHAMBER"],"itemid":["
001-160020"]} (stating: “[i]t is in this context that the external, preferably judicial, a posteriori 
control of secret surveillance activities, both in individual cases and as general supervision, gains 
its true importance.” (citation omitted)) [hereinafter Case of Szabó and Vissy ]; Joseph A. 
Cannataci (U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy), Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Privacy, at ¶¶ 25–26, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/60 (Feb. 24, 2017) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/34/60]. 
51 Case of Szabó and Vissy, supra note 50, at ¶ 21.  
52 Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 260 (“Turning now to the authorisation [sic] 
authority’s scope of review, the Court reiterates that it must be capable of verifying the existence 
of a reasonable suspicion against the person concerned, in particular, whether there are factual 
indications for suspecting that person of planning, committing or having committed criminal acts 
or other acts that may give rise to secret surveillance measures, such as, for example, acts 
endangering national security.”); Case of Szabó and Vissy, supra note 50, at ¶ 71 (“There is no 
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tasked with oversight responsibilities, provided they are sufficiently 
independent from the executive branch.53  
Sixth, the interference must be accompanied by a remedy.54 The 
remedy must be effective. It must not merely take the form of empty words 
that leave individuals powerless to seek redress and curb government 
abuse.55  
It is important to note that the overall aim of these standards is to limit 
government discretion. Because of its secrecy and lack of transparency, 
government surveillance is especially prone to abuse.56 The abuse of 
surveillance powers not only threatens the rights of individuals, but can 
also result in political control and the erosion of democracy.57 Therefore, it 
would be “contrary to the rule of law for the discretion granted . . . to be 
expressed in terms of an unfettered power.”58 By limiting government 
discretion, these protections reduce the risk of arbitrary interference and 
abuse.59 It follows that legal protections that are worded ambiguously, 
provide toothless oversight powers, or in any other way leave government 
discretion excessive in practice—regardless of what is written down on 
paper—fail to satisfy a state’s obligations under international human rights 
law.  
 
B. HOW THE U.S. MLA PROCESSES PROTECT HUMAN RIGHTS  
 
The current U.S. MLA process affords subjects of data collection 
effective legal protections. It entails prior merits-based judicial 
authorization that is conditioned upon sufficient factual support.60 Just as 
the European Court of Human Rights requires “a reasonable suspicion” 
against an individual, supported by “factual indications for suspecting that 
person of planning, committing or having committed criminal acts,” a U.S. 
court requires probable cause or “specific and articulable facts showing 
                                                                                                           
particular, a sufficient factual basis for the application of secret intelligence gathering measures 
which would enable the evaluation of necessity of the proposed measure - and this on the basis of 
an individual suspicion regarding the target person. For the Court, only such information would 
allow the authorising [sic] authority to perform an appropriate proportionality test.” (citations 
omitted)); Joined cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen, Sec’y 
of State for Home Dep’t v. Watson, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 970, at ¶¶ 103–07, 112 (Dec. 
21, 2016). 
53 See, e.g., Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 275; Weber v. Germany, App. No. 
54934/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2006) (describing a sufficiently independent non-judicial oversight 
process).  
54 See Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 220. 
55 See, e.g., id. at ¶ 298 (finding a remedy insufficient because it relied on knowledge of 
surveillance, despite a lack of mandatory notification).  
56 Id. at ¶ 230. 
57 See, e.g., China has Turned Xinjiang into a Police State Like No Other, ECONOMIST (May 
31, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/05/31/china-has-turned-xinjiang-into-a-
police-state-like-no-other (“A system called the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), first 
revealed by Human Rights Watch, uses machine-learning systems, information from cameras, 
smartphones, financial and family-planning records and even unusual electricity use to generate 
lists of suspects for detention. One official WeChat report said that verifying IJOP’s lists was one 
of the main responsibilities of the local security committee. Even without high-tech surveillance, 
Xinjiang’s police state is formidable. With it, it becomes terrifying . . . Islam is a special target.”). 
58 Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 230. 
59 Id.  
60 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (a court order will not be issued without 
“specific and articulable facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the 
contents of a wire or electronic communication, or the records or other information sought, are 
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 41 (a warrant 
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that there are reasonable grounds to believe” information sought is relevant 
to a crime.61 An additional layer of independent oversight is provided by 
OIA’s approval of incoming requests and outgoing responses.62  
If the loss of these protections in new legal instruments is not balanced 
with alternative protections, much of the world’s population may be left 
vulnerable to arbitrary and abusive data collection practices by domestic 
law enforcement agencies.  
 
 C. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THESE LEGAL PROTECTIONS ARE ABSENT  
 
Far from being a hypothetical concern, both history and contemporary 
events show that the absence of legal restrictions on government access to 
data when that data is technically easily obtainable, quickly results in 
abuses of power, human rights violations, and political control. The 
Chinese government, for example, uses predictive policing methods, fueled 
by “big data,” to continuously monitor members of an ethnic minority 
group and deter dissent, ostensibly for national security purposes.63 
Hundreds of thousands of members of this group have been funneled into 
“concentrated transformation-through-education center[s].”64 
 
  
III. RECENT LEGISLATION AND PROPOSALS 
 
 
Recently proposed or enacted legal instruments designed to streamline 
cross-border data access include the U.S. CLOUD Act, the EU’s e-
Evidence proposal, the Council of Europe’s potential Second Additional 
Protocol to the Budapest Convention, and a proposal for an International 
Data Access Warrant by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to 
privacy. Only the CLOUD Act has been enacted.  
 
A. CLOUD ACT:  
 
The CLOUD Act enables both the U.S. government and foreign 
governments to access data controlled by U.S. companies more easily. 
First, U.S. law enforcement agencies may compel production of data, 
regardless of where the data are stored.65 Second, the legislation lifts 
 
 
61 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d); Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶ 260 (discussing the need for 
reasonable suspicion). 
62 LIN & FIDLER, supra note 8, at 2–3. 
63 Human Rights Watch, China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region (Feb. 26, 
2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region; 
Human Rights Watch, China: Police ‘Big Data’ Systems Violate Privacy, Target Dissent (Nov. 
19, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/19/china-police-big-data-systems-violate-privacy-
target-dissentl.  
64 Chris Buckley, China Is Detaining Muslims in Vast Numbers. The Goal: ‘Transformation,’ 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/08/world/asia/china-uighur-
muslim-detention-camp.html (“In addition to the mass detentions, the authorities have intensified 
the use of informers and expanded police surveillance, even installing cameras in some people’s 
homes. Human rights activists and experts say the campaign has traumatized Uighur society, 
leaving behind fractured communities and families. ‘Penetration of everyday life is almost really 
total now.’”).  
65 18 U.S.C. § 2713 (2018) (“A provider . . . shall comply . . . regardless of whether such 
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restrictions on U.S. company compliance with direct foreign requests made 
outside of the MLA process, when the foreign government is a party to an 
executive agreement made pursuant to the CLOUD Act.66 A state’s 
eligibility for an agreement is determined by the U.S. Attorney General’s 
assessment of the state’s legal system.  
 
1. Speed and Efficiency 
 
The CLOUD Act is designed to increase the speed and efficiency of 
cross-border data access for both the U.S. government and selected foreign 
governments. The legislation eliminates OIA and U.S. judicial approval 
requirements for states party to executive agreements made pursuant to the 
Act.67 It creates reciprocal rights, under which the U.S. government may 
demand data stored anywhere when controlled by companies under U.S. 
jurisdiction.68 This will presumably reduce wait-times from months to 
days.69 In addition, this would reduce the OIA’s workload, benefitting all 
states that request data through the U.S. MLA process.  
 
2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality 
 
While the CLOUD Act prevents jurisdictional conflicts and violations 
of state sovereignty between the U.S. and parties to executive agreements, 
it does not necessarily do so for other countries.  
The CLOUD Act reduces the risk of violations of state sovereignty 
between the U.S. and states parties to executive agreements in two ways. 
First, it creates reciprocal rights of access that remove barriers to direct 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies in one state and service 
providers in another.70 Second, a service provider may file a motion to 
quash or modify a U.S. demand if compliance would violate the law of a 
state party to a CLOUD Act agreement.71 When assessing this motion, a 
court will engage in a comity analysis, which balances the interests of the 
U.S. government and foreign governments.72  
However, the interests of countries not party to an executive 
agreement are inadequately addressed. Given that data is stored all over the 
world, it is also likely to be stored in states not party to these agreements.73 
The CLOUD Act does not enable a company to file a motion to modify or 
quash a U.S. order or warrant due to a conflict of law with a state not party 




66 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(5) (2018). 
67 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(5). 
68 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(I); 18 U.S.C. § 2713. 
69 Infra Part II, Section (A).  
70 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(I). 
71 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2).  
72 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(3); William S. Dodge, International Comity in American Law, 115 
COLUM. L. REV. 2071, 2078 (2015) (defining international comity as “deference to foreign 
government actors that is not required by international law but is incorporated in domestic law,” 
which is in part a presumption against extraterritoriality).  
73 Reisman, supra note 24.  
74 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2) (stating that motions to quash or modify may be filed where “the 
required disclosure would create a material risk that the provider would violate the laws of a 
qualifying foreign government”); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(1)(A)(i) (defining a qualifying foreign 
government as one “with which the United States has an executive agreement that has entered into 
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3. Human Rights  
 
The CLOUD Act promotes human rights protections by conditioning 
executive agreements on the satisfaction of minimum standards in 
domestic law and by imposing certain requirements in the terms of 
agreements and requests made pursuant to these agreements. Though the 
legislation’s long list of conditions and requirements may at first glance 
seem impressive, upon greater scrutiny, most are meaningless.  
 
i. Protections in Domestic Law 
 
The legislation enumerates “factors” the Attorney General must 
consider when determining whether a potential state party provides 
sufficiently strong substantive and procedural protections in the context of 
data collection to qualify for an agreement.75 Most of these factors are 
worded ambiguously, effectively making them optional. 
The first factor is whether the state is party to the Budapest 
Convention.76 Yet this treaty merely reiterates states parties’ obligations 
under general-purpose human rights treaties, and lacks specific protections 
applicable to cross-border data access.77  
Second, the state must “demonstrate[] respect for the rule of law and 
principles of nondiscrimination.”78 Neither the “rule of law” nor the 
“principle of nondiscrimination” is defined in the CLOUD Act. This is 
problematic because they are broad terms that can be interpreted in a 
multitude of ways, some of which are merely formalistic and do not 
constrain government power in practice.79  
Third, a state must “adher[e] to applicable international human rights 
obligations and commitments or demonstrat[e] respect for international 
universal human rights” with respect to privacy, “the freedom[s] of 
expression, association, and [] assembly,” “prohibitions on arbitrary 
arrest,” “torture, and cruel, inhumane, or degrading” punishment.80  
Yet these international legal obligations are not completely settled. So, 
without further clarification, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
make this determination objectively. Applicable treaty language is vague 
about online privacy and personal data.81 Jurists and legal scholars are only 
just beginning to interpret privacy rights for the digital age.82 Additionally, 
 
 
75 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B). 
76 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(i).  
77 Zahid Jamil, The Budapest Convention: Investigative Powers & Article 15, COUNCIL EUR. 
(Aug. 11, 2014), https://rm.coe.int/16803028b2. 
78 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(ii). 
79 See, e.g., BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY, 92–
93, 96 (2004) (discussing “rule by law,” a concept that guides the Chinese government, as well as 
the “emptiness of formal legality . . . [which] runs contrary to the long tradition of the rule of law, 
the historical inspiration of which has been the restraint of tyranny by the sovereign. Such restraint 
went beyond the idea that the government must enact and abide by laws that take on the proper 
form of rules, to include the understanding that there were certain things the government or 
sovereign could not do . . . Formal legality discards this orientation. Consistent with formal 
legality, the government can do as it wishes, so long as it is able to pursue those desires in terms 
consistent with (general, clear, certain, and public) legal rules declared in advance.”).  
80 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(iii). 
81 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, 92 U.S.T. 908, 999 U.N.T.S. 17; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union, art. 7, 8, 2000 O.J. (C364) 1 (2000). 
82 Most relevant case law and international organization publications postdate 2013. See, e.g., 
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state practice varies immensely, even between likeminded western 
democracies, demonstrating that there is insufficient global uniformity to 
establish customary law.83  
Moreover, the phrase “adheres to applicable international human rights 
obligations and commitments or demonstrates respect for international 
universal human rights” implies that a state could fail to satisfy its legal 
obligations, but nonetheless be certified as a result of an empty gesture.84 
The remaining factors are only somewhat more concrete. A potential 
state party must have “clear legal mandates and procedures” authorizing 
law enforcement data collection, as well as “sufficient” accountability 
mechanisms and an “appropriate” amount of transparency for this 
activity.85 While it is important to determine that a legal basis for this 
activity exists, the legislation says nothing about the acceptable amount of 
discretion these mandates and procedures afford foreign law enforcement 
agencies. What kind of oversight is “sufficient”? What level of 
transparency is “appropriate”?  
Finally, a potential state party must “demonstrate a commitment” to 
promote and protect Internet openness and the free flow of information.86 
Presumably this provision is intended to discourage data localization, one 
of the perceived benefits of the legislation, but this language does not 
prohibit the practice outright.87  
 
ii. Terms of the Agreements  
 
The CLOUD Act states that an agreement made pursuant to the 
legislation “shall not create any obligation that providers be capable of 
decryption data or limitation that prevents providers from decrypting 
data.”88 Mandated decryption capabilities, or encryption backdoors, 
                                                                                                           
for Private and Family Life, Home and Correspondence 92–97 (Aug. 31, 2018), 
https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_8_ENG.pdf; Joseph A. Cannataci (U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the right to privacy), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/64 (Nov. 24, 2016) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/31/64]; Frank La Rue 
(U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013). 
83 Compare Ieuan Jolly et. al., Data Protection in the United States: Overview , 
THOMSON REUTERS PRAC. L. (July 1, 2017), 
https://content.next.westlaw.com/Document/I02064fbd1cb611e38578f7ccc38dcbee/View/Ful
lText.html?contextData=(sc.Default)&transitionType=Default&firstPage=true&bhcp=1, with 
European Commission, Data Protection in the EU (May 6, 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/data-protection-eu_en. 
84 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(iii). Empty gestures in international human rights law abound. 
See, e.g., Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of Withdrawal of Reservations 
Relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, 
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (Apr. 10, 2006) (enumerating the states parties to CEDAW that 
have made reservations to Article 2, which effectively nullifies all other CEDAW obligations); 
International Law Association, International Law Association Report on the Treaty System (1996), 
http://www.bayefsky.com/reform/ila.php (“For a great many states ratification has become an end 
in itself, a means to easy accolades for empty gestures . . . [R]atification by human rights 
adversaries is purchased at a price, namely, diminished obligations, lax supervision, and few 
adverse consequences from non-compliance.”).  
85 18 U.S.C. §§ 2523(b)(1)(B)(iv)–(v).  
86 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(vi).  
87 See, e.g., Andrew K. Woods & Peter Swire, The CLOUD Act: A Welcome Legislative Fix 
for Cross-Border Data Problems, LAWFARE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cloud-
act-welcome-legislative-fix-cross-border-data-problems; contra Consolidated Appropriations Act 
of 2018, ch. 119, sec, 105, § 2253(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 115-141, 132 Stat. 348 (2018) (the 
ambiguous language of the CLOUD Act with the specific language of the draft legal instrument). 
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threaten human rights; in particular the right to hold an opinion, access to 
information, and freedom of expression.89 While this language limits one 
avenue for the creation of encryption backdoors, it wastes an opportunity 
to prohibit them outright.  
 
iii. Requirements for Individual Orders 
 
Requirements for individual orders are designed to limit government 
discretion, and include purpose limitation, targeting requirements, and 
rules for sharing and oversight.  
 
a. Purpose Limitation 
 
The CLOUD Act limits the purposes for which orders can be sent by 
foreign governments to “serious crime[s], including terrorism,” which may 
not include infringements on the freedom of speech.90 Yet the term 
“serious crime” is undefined, and absent further clarification may be 




The most concrete and stringent legal protections replicate existing 
U.S. judicial standards. The subject of a data request must be described by 
“a specific person, account, address, or personal device, or any other 
specific identifier.”92 Additionally, a request must include “a reasonable 
justification based on articulable and credible facts, particularity, legality, 
and the severity regarding the conduct under investigation.”93 These 
requirements mirror emerging human rights standards, according to which 
surveillance is permissible only where reasonable and individualized 
suspicion exists.94 This narrow targeting helps to prevent disproportionate, 
indiscriminate data collection.95  
 
c. Safeguards for Sharing 
 
Importantly, the legislation limits intergovernmental sharing practices 
that allow governments to circumvent domestic legal protections. First, an 
individual order cannot be served for the purpose of providing data to the 
U.S. government or a third country’s government.96 Second, the foreign 
government “may not” share content with the U.S. government, unless it 
 
 
89 See generally David Kaye (U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the 
right to freedom of opinion and expression), Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion 
and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/29/32 
(May 22, 2015). 
90 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(i); 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(E).  
91 See, e.g., Rebecca Hill, UK.gov Agrees to Narrow ‘Serious Crime’ Definition for Slurping 
Comms Data, REGISTER (July 11, 2018),  
https://www.theregister.co.uk/2018/07/11/ukgov_agrees_to_narrow_serious_crime_definition_for
_sucking_up_comms_data/ (describing how the U.K. government recently increased the minimum 
imprisonment threshold for a serious crime from six months—which encompasses minor crimes, 
such as shoplifting—to twelve months, for the purposes of surveillance authorization).  
92 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(ii).  
93 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(iv). 
94 See Case of Szabó and Vissy, supra note 50, at ¶ 71. 
95 See e.g., id. 
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relates to a severe offense, such as terrorism or “significant violent 
crime.”97 If the U.S. government does receive this information, it must 
apply minimization procedures derived from the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act.98 These rules partially address the loopholes created by 
arrangements, such as “Five Eyes” intelligence sharing, in which the U.S. 
and several partner states reciprocally share information obtained through 
foreign intelligence operations, which allows each state to systematically 
circumvent stronger domestic legal safeguards on data collection.99 
However, these provisions leave open the possibility that a state party 
could collect large amounts of information on behalf of other countries and 
share it voluntarily with the implicit understanding that this will be 
reciprocated. Only the sharing of content with U.S. authorities is restricted, 
and there is no restriction on sharing information with third countries in the 
legislation.100 Yet, as others have discussed in depth, metadata, including 
subscriber information, is just as revealing content.101 In practice, these 




a. Domestic Oversight 
 
The legislation requires some form of domestic independent oversight 
in which each order is reviewable.102 Yet it provides no additional criteria. 
The language—“review or oversight” by the judiciary “or other 
independent authority prior to, or in proceedings regarding, enforcement of 
the order”—could encompass anything from prior merits-based judicial 
approval to a merely nominally independent review body that acts as a 
rubber stamp.103 If no provisions require meaningful oversight or approval 
by the judicial or legislative branch, the executive branches could be left to 
police itself, increasing the risk of abuse.104  
 
b. U.S. Oversight 
 
Some degree of U.S. oversight is envisioned, though—once again—
the imprecise wording could produce anything from systematic oversight 
to spotty rubber-stamping. The U.S. government may “render the 
agreement inapplicable” for requests that do not meet the agreement’s 
requirements.105 In other words, if a foreign request is insufficiently 
 
 
97 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(H).  
98 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(G)–(H).  
99 See, e.g., Alex Sinha, British Spying is Our Problem, Too, AM. C.L. UNION BLOG (Nov. 10, 2014), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/secrecy/british-spying-our-problem-too?redirect=blog/national-
security/british-spying-our-problem-too (“The United States has extensive intelligence-sharing arrangements 
with key allies like the U.K., and through them has access to information that it can’t legally collect on its 
own. Sharing flows both ways, so the U.K. also has unfettered access to much ‘raw’ or unfiltered U.S. 
surveillance data.”).  
100 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(H).  
101 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/60, supra note 50, at ¶ 25 (arguing that metadata “are at 
least as revealing of a person’s individual activity as the actual content of a conversation”).  
102 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(D)(v). 
103 Id.; 18 U.S.C §§ 1804–05 (2010) (describing the perfunctory approval process for 
surveillance under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments 
Act of 2008).  
104 See, e.g., Case of Szabó and Vissy, supra note 50, at ¶¶ 75, 77.  
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targeted, or the U.S. government does not consider the relevant offense 
serious, then—for that particular request—the state party would be forced 
to obtain the information through the normal MLA process or some other 
method. It is unclear how an improperly invoked order would be detected 
be the U.S. government, as these agreements would be designed to largely 
eliminate U.S. government involvement, and the CLOUD Act provides 
only limited grounds for a company to challenge a foreign request.106  
Additionally, the state party must agree to “periodic review of 
compliance” by the U.S. government.107 The period between reviews is not 
specified. Would it be monthly, yearly, or perhaps every five years? Would 
it be effective, enabling American reviewers to access all relevant 
documents and act to stop abuses?108  
Outside of the executive branch, only a joint resolution by Congress 
can block an executive agreement, if it is insufficiently protective of 
human rights.109 No judicial challenges are permitted for the certification 
of a state.110  
 
v. Political Considerations 
 
Given the flexibility of this language, whether it adequately protects 
human rights depends almost entirely on how permissively it is interpreted 
by the Attorney General. Considering the current Attorney General’s 
record on human rights issues, and his apparent lack of legal expertise in 
online privacy and data protection issues, this does not inspire 
confidence.111  
 
B. E-EVIDENCE PROPOSAL  
 
Legislation proposed by the European Commission would permit a 
judicial or investigative authority to compel the production of electronic 
evidence for criminal investigations from service provider representatives 
in the EU, regardless of where the data is stored. The e-Evidence proposal 
includes a draft directive that would require any service provider “offering 
services” in the EU to provide a legal representative physically located in 
the EU to receive data production and preservation orders.112 These orders, 
called the European Production Order and the European Preservation 
Order, would be issued pursuant to the second half of the proposal, a draft 
regulation.113 Upon receipt, the representative would be required to 
preserve or produce sought-after electronic evidence in the service 
 
 
106 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2) (2018). 
107 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(4)(J). 
108 See Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 281, 282 (discussing elements of oversight 
effectiveness).  
109 18 U.S.C. § 2523(d)(4).  
110 18 U.S.C. § 2523(c). 
111 See, e.g., Jeff Sessions Issues Directive Undercutting LGBT Protections, GUARDIAN (Oct. 
6, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/06/jeff-sessions-issues-directive-
undercutting-lgbtq-protections; Vann R. Newkirk II, The End of Civil Rights, ATLANTIC (June 18, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/sessions/563006/.  
112 Draft Directive, supra note 2, at art. 2(1)–(3), 3 (The definition of “offering services” 
encompasses major U.S. tech companies, as they “enable[e] legal or natural persons in a Member 
State to use the services” and “hav[e] a substantial connection to the Member State.”). 
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provider’s control.114 Like the CLOUD Act, by rendering the location of 
data irrelevant, these orders would allow law enforcement authorities in 
member states to circumvent existing MLAT proceedings. 
 
1. Speed and Efficiency  
 
Generally, a company will have a ten-day time limit for compliance.115 
The time limit is reduced to six hours in emergency cases.116 This is, of 
course, a dramatically shorter period of time than the months-long wait 
time member states often face when seeking data through the MLA 
process.117  
 
2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality 
 
The draft regulation envisions procedures similar to a CLOUD Act 
comity analysis for potential conflicts of law. If a service provider fears 
that compliance with a production order will violate the law of a third 
country, meaning a country outside of the EU, it can send a reasoned 
objection to the law enforcement agency that issued the order.118 The 
agency must then request a review by a court in its state if it wishes to 
pursue the order.119 That court must determine whether the third country’s 
law prohibits disclosure.120 If it finds no conflict, it will order the company 
to comply.121 If the court identifies a conflict, and the relevant area of law 
concerns fundamental rights, national security, or defense, it will leave the 
decision with the “central authorities” of the affected third country.122 If 
the conflict relates to a different area of law, the court in the member state 
will make the decision alone, according to what is more-or-less a comity 
analysis, while also taking into account the interests of the company.123  
Like the U.S. comity analysis, this process would greatly reduce the 
chance that a third country’s territorial sovereignty would be violated, but 
would not be absolutely preclusive. When evaluating a potential conflict of 
law arising from something other than fundamental rights, national 
security, or defense, a member state court would consider “the interest 
protected by the relevant law of the third country” as one of several 
factors, and the physical presence of the data in the third state would not be 
an outright bar to enforcement of the production order.124  
 
3. Human Rights  
 
The EU’s broader legal context—including both EU law and the 
overlapping European Convention on Human Rights—combined with 
 
 
114 Draft Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 9, 10. 
115 Id. at art. 9(1). 
116 Id. at art. 9(2). 
117 Infra Part II, Section (A).  
118 Draft Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 15, 16.  
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 Id.  
122 Id. at art.15(5)–(7). 
123 Id. at art.16(5)–(6). 
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requirements in the draft regulation, could render the loss of U.S. 
procedural protections largely irrelevant.  
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights guarantees the right to privacy 
and personal data protection.125 These rights are further clarified in case 
law from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which, 
among other things, prohibits indiscriminate data collection by 
governments, and mirrors the “necessary and proportionate” framework 
found in international legal materials.126 More specific legislation 
constrains law enforcement data collection and other surveillance 
methods.127 Additionally, all EU member states are party to the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which provides similar protections.128  
The draft regulation specifies its own legal protections. Similar to the 
U.S. MLA process, it requires prior or subsequent judicial validation for 
access to content. Unlike U.S. law, it would further require judicial 
involvement for access to “transactional data,” a form of non-content 
data.129 Orders would be conditioned upon necessity and proportionality.130 
Additionally, member states would provide an “effective” judicial remedy 
for people whose data were obtained using a production order.131 
Importantly, both suspects and non-suspects would have access to this 
remedy.132 An individual would have the opportunity to challenge the 
necessity, proportionality, or legality of the order.133  
Nevertheless, domestic practices can, at least in the short term, 
undermine regional human rights legal protections.134 This highlights the 
 
 
125 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 7, 8(1), 2000 O.J. (C364) 1 
(2000) (“Everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and 
communications . . . Everyone has the right to the protection of personal data concerning him or 
her.”). 
126 Joined cases C-203/15 & C-698/15, Tele2 Sverige AB v. Post- och telestyrelsen, Sec’y of 
State for Home Dep’t v. Watson, 2016 EUR-Lex CELEX LEXIS 970, at ¶¶ 94–96, 103 (Dec. 21, 
2016); Case C-362/14. Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner, Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber) (E.C.J. 2015) (“[L]egislation permitting the public authorities to have access on a 
generalised [sic] basis to the content of electronic communications must be regarded as 
compromising the essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by 
Article 7 of the Charter . . . Likewise, legislation not providing for any possibility for an individual 
to pursue legal remedies in order to have access to personal data relating to him, or to obtain the 
rectification or erasure of such data, does not respect the essence of the fundamental right to 
effective judicial protection, as enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.”); see also Joined cases C-
293/12 & C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, at 45–54, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) (E.C.J. 2014) (“Article 52(1) of the Charter provides that 
any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms laid down by the Charter must be 
provided for by law, respect their essence and, subject to the principle of proportionality, 
limitations may be made to those rights and freedoms only if they are necessary and genuinely 
meet objectives of general interest recognised [sic] by the Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others.”). 
127 See, e.g., Council Directive 2016/680, art. 4–11, 53–54, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 89 (EU); 
Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 48, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU). 
128 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, opened 
for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; see also, e.g., Zakharov v. Russia, supra note 38, at 
¶ 231; Case of Szabó & Vissy, supra note 50. 
129 Draft Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 4(2). 
130 Id. at art. 5. 
131 Id. at art. 17(3) (“Such right to an effective remedy shall be exercised before a court in the 
issuing State in accordance with its national law and shall include the possibility to challenge the 
legality of the measure, including its necessity and proportionality.”).  
132 Id. at art. 17(1)–(2). 
133 Id. at art. 17(3).  
134
 See, e.g., Privacy International, Liberty, and Open Rights Group Joined Other 
Organisations Across the EU to File Complaints Over Member States’ Non-Compliance with 
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practical value of an external check on potential abuses of domestic law 
enforcement powers.  
Therefore, despite the robust legal framework provided by the EU and 
ECHR, the loss of U.S. protections could leave the citizens of at least some 
EU member states subject to indiscriminate data collection by domestic 
law enforcement.  
 
C. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE BUDAPEST CONVENTION  
 
The Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Convention Committee is 
currently drafting a Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest 
Convention, with the intention of streamlining access to cross-border 
electronic evidence.135 The Budapest Convention requires states parties, 
which include the U.S. and other non-Council of Europe countries, to both 
cooperate in MLA requests and maintain certain capabilities for collecting 
electronic evidence to facilitate this process.136 The protocol would address 
contemporary challenges associated with “cloud-based” evidence, which 
can be stored in different jurisdictions.137  
Although the final form of the proposal has not yet been published, 
some details about the drafters’ intentions appear in preparatory 
documents. First, the protocol will likely require state parties to permit 
service providers in their jurisdictions to disclose subscriber information to 
law enforcement authorities in other state parties “voluntarily,” meaning 
without a domestic warrant obtained through an MLA process.138 This 
would partially replicate the exception in the ECPA that permits U.S. 
service providers to comply with direct requests for non-content data from 
foreign governments.139 Second, it will likely create international 
production and preservation orders, mirroring the e-Evidence proposal.140 
Third, it will possibly contain additional human rights safeguards to 
accompany these newly created powers. Fourth, the protocol will likely 
clarify the restrictions on unilateral measures issued to circumvent the 
MLA process.141  
 
1. Speed and Efficiency  
 
Hypothetically, voluntary disclosure regimes and mandatory 
production orders would reduce waiting periods for access to cross-border 
data. Given that subscriber data is the most sought type of data in law 
enforcement investigations, a voluntary disclosure scheme would greatly 
                                                                                                           
https://privacyinternational.org/press-release/2119/privacy-international-liberty-and-open-
rights-group-joined-other-organisations [hereinafter Privacy International]. 
135 Terms of Reference, supra note 2; see also Discussion Guide for Consultations with Civil 
Society, Data Protection Authorities and Industry, CYBERCRIME CONVENTION COMMITTEE, (May 
21, 2018), https://rm.coe.int/t-cy-2018-16-pdp-consultations-paper/16808add27 [hereinafter 
Discussion Guide]. For those unfamiliar with the difference between the EU and Council of 
Europe institutions, see Do Not Get Confused, COUNCIL EUROPE, 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/do-not-get-confused (last accessed Apr. 20, 2019). 
136 Budapest Convention, supra note 2, at art. 14, 29–34. 
137 Terms of Reference, supra note 2, at 3.  
138 Budapest Convention, supra note 2, at art. 18 (defining subscriber information as non-
content information pertaining to a user’s identity, postal or geographic address, telephone or other 
access number, and billing or payment information); Discussion Guide, supra note 135, at 5–6.  
139 Discussion Guide, supra note 135, at 5–6. 
140 Id. at 7. 
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help to alleviate the overall burden of the existing MLA regime.142 
Currently, most state parties to the Convention do not permit this kind of 
direct cooperation with foreign law enforcement requests.143  
Additionally, an international production order modeled after the 
European Production Order would presumably reduce waiting periods, as 
it would likely eliminate foreign MLA proceedings for law enforcement 
agencies.144 A mandatory production order, like the proposed European 
Production Order, would prevent situations in which a service provider 
chooses not to comply with a discretionary request.145  
 
2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality 
 
By coupling mandatory production orders with voluntary disclosure 
regimes, the Protocol would reduce the likelihood of friction between 
states concerning jurisdiction over data. Assuming the Protocol would 
require reciprocal rights for state parties—this prior consent would prevent 
violations of state sovereignty between state parties.146 Furthermore, the 
voluntary disclosure scheme would help to prevent conflicts from arising 
by preventing the use of coercive legal methods or the need for approval 
by foreign governments.147  
 
3. Human Rights  
 
Few details have been provided about the Protocol’s potential human 
rights protections. However, given how little print space has been devoted 
to the topic thus far, it may wind up being an afterthought.148 This would 
not be surprising, given that the same could be said about the Budapest 
Convention, which merely reiterates governments’ obligations under 
general-purpose human rights treaties.149  
This presents a problem because there is substantial variation in the 
domestic legal protections afforded by parties to the Budapest Convention 
to people whose data are sought in law enforcement investigations. While 
most parties are members of both the Council of Europe and the EU, 
whose legal frameworks, at least hypothetically, provide robust baseline 
human rights protections, some state parties provide far weaker or 
qualitatively different protections. For example, recently enacted data 
protection legislation in Turkey provides few checks on government abuse 
of data collection powers.150  
Nationals of these countries would suffer a loss of U.S. procedural 
protections for content and easier access to subscriber information in other 
countries. Mandatory production orders would deprive non-U.S. persons 
the external check currently provided by the U.S. MLA process on the 
 
 
142 T-CY Assessment Report, supra note 4, at 123. 
143 Discussion Guide, supra note 135, at 5. 
144 See infra Part IV, Section (B)(1); Discussion Guide, supra note 135, at 7. 
145 See, e.g., Impact Assessment, supra note 7, at 15–16 (demonstrating that less than half of 
direct requests sent by EU member States to (mainly U.S.) service providers are fulfilled). 
146 See infra Part II, Section (C). 
147 Id.  
148 See generally Terms of Reference, supra note 2; Discussion Guide, supra note 135. 
149 Budapest Convention, supra note 2, at art. 15(1). 
150 Craig Shaw & Zeynep Sentek, ‘Citizens Will Be Stripped Naked’ by Turkey’s Data Law, 
COMPUTER WKLY. (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.computerweekly.com/news/450280254/Citizens-
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abuse of data collection powers by domestic law enforcement agencies; at 
least with regard to content. Additionally, while the U.S. already permits 
companies to voluntarily disclose subscriber information, this is 
problematic, and the expansion of this practice would be even more so. 
Ready availability of subscriber information undermines online anonymity, 
which is crucial for the protection of human rights in the digital age.151  
 
D. INTERNATIONAL DATA ACCESS WARRANT  
 
These differences in domestic human rights protections would be 
rendered largely irrelevant in the draft legal instrument under consideration 
by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy.152 As a potential 
international treaty, it would impose common standards and rules 
pertaining to cross-border data access derived from international human 
rights law and would also transfer authorization power from domestic 
authorities to an international body.  
As it now stands, the draft legal instrument would create an alternative 
to the MLA process through the creation of an international judicial body 
empowered to issue International Data Access Warrants.153 A domestic 
law enforcement agency or investigator could send an application directly 
to this judicial body, which could then issue a warrant to a service provider 
located in any other state party.154 
 
1. Speed and Efficiency  
 
Though no maximum response time is specified, the scheme 
envisioned in the draft legal instrument would increase the speed and 
efficiency of the data access process through remote deliberations, 
adequate resourcing, twenty-four hour scheduling, and more generally, 
providing a streamlined procedure.155 State parties would be required to 
provide “adequate resources for the efficient working” of the bodies 
created by the instrument, which would help to prevent OIA-style 
backlogs.156 Wherever possible, proceedings would be carried out 
online.157 Empirical evidence shows that online dispute resolution tools, 
including remote video testimony, reduce the length and cost of judicial 
proceedings.158 This “one-stop shop” would eliminate the need for lengthy 




151 See generally Kaye, supra note 89. 
152 Draft Legal Instrument, supra note 2; Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right to 
Privacy at ¶¶ 114, 127, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/62 (Feb. 28, 2018) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/37/62]. 
153 Draft Legal Instrument, supra note 2, at art. 15. 
154 Id. at art. 4(1)(j), 15(2)(b)(ii).  
155 Id. at art. 15(3)–(5), art. 15 cmt. 1310–15 (“The creation of such a mechanism would, if the 
IDAA is properly resourced and staffed, cut down waiting times for transfer of personal data 
required by law enforcement, prosecutors and intelligence services by weeks and often by an 
average of up to eleven months. With panels of judges working world-wide in a secure on-line 
manner, on a rota 24/7, urgent requests for access to personal data, whether in real-time or 
historical, for legitimate surveillance purposes could be handled quickly and efficiently.”). 
156 Id. at art. 15(4)–(5) (any state failing to make its required contributions would be 
suspended). 
157 Id. at art. 15(3)(a). 
158 Id. at art. 15(4). 
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2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality 
 
At least among parties to the not-yet-proposed instrument, this design 
would prevent violations of state sovereignty and reduce the risk of 
international discord. Service providers in state parties would be required 
to comply with International Data Access Warrants and could not justify 
noncompliance on the basis of jurisdiction or territoriality.160 A state could 
not circumvent the international warrant process via unilateral measures, 
absent another form of prior consent from the affected state.161  
Importantly, this draft instrument could take the form of an 
international treaty, potentially open to all U.N. member states.162 The 
resulting universal or near-universal consent could effectively render 
uncertainty about jurisdiction irrelevant.  
 
3. Human Rights  
 
Unsurprisingly, the draft legal instrument features a robust human 
rights framework, consisting of multilayered independent oversight, 





a. Prior Judicial Authorization 
 
An international judicial body established by the draft legal instrument 
would approve or reject applications from domestic law enforcement 
agencies for International Data Access Warrants.163 This body would be 
comprised of a lower-level body called the International Data Access 
Commission and an appellate-level body called the International Data 
Access Tribunal.164 Each application for data access would be assessed by 
a panel of three judges in the Commission, and, if appealed, by five judges 
in the Tribunal.165 
The independence of decision-making would be guaranteed not only 
by the involvement of judges, but also by the insulation of judges from 
domestic political pressure. Though judges would be nominated by state 
parties, they would be remunerated by an independent body established by 
the draft legal instrument.166 Decisions would be based on simple majority 
votes by panels randomly selected through automation, with only one seat 
reserved for a judge nominated by the applicant state.167 It would be highly 
unlikely that one state’s executive branch could effectively influence the 




160 Id. at art. 4(1)(j).  
161 Id. at art. 4(4)(a).  
162 See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/37/62, supra note 152, at ¶ 127.  
163 Draft Legal Instrument, supra note 2, at art. 15(2)(b), (d). 
164 Id.  
165 Id. 
166 Id. at art. 15(2)(b)(i), 15(2)(d)(i), 15(4)(a). 
167 Id. at art. 15(2)(b)(iii). 
168 In fact, interference with the workings of the commission would result in suspension from 
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b. Systematic Oversight 
 
More general oversight would be carried out by two committees. A 
committee of human rights legal experts called the Committee of Human 
Rights Defenders would produce an annual report, including the number of 
cases monitored, difficulties encountered in the course of this work, and 
recommendations for best practices.169 A second consultative committee 
would monitor all procedures undertaken pursuant to the legal instrument 
and make recommendations about the interpretation of, and potential 
amendments to, the legal instrument.170  
 
ii. Adversarial Component 
 
In each warrant application process, a Human Rights Defender would 
be randomly assigned to monitor the process, and if appropriate, advocate 
on behalf of the subject.171 The Human Rights Defender would “have the 
right of audience and to present arguments . . . where it is felt that [the] 
surveillance requested is unnecessary, disproportionate or in any way 
breaches [the subject’s] fundamental human rights.”172  
 
iii. Domestic Legal Requirements 
 
Eligibility for ratification of the draft legal instrument would, in part, 
be conditioned upon the adoption of stringent human rights protections in 
domestic law for domestic surveillance.173 Among these requirements is 
multilayered oversight that includes independent prior authorization, a 
sufficiently detailed and publicly accessible legal basis for surveillance, 
requirements for necessity, proportionality, and reasonable suspicion, and a 
remedy.174 
  
E. COMPARING THE PROPOSALS  
 
Only the draft legal instrument for the International Data Access 
Warrant adequately addresses challenges related to speed, jurisdiction, and 
human rights.  
 
1. Speed and Efficiency  
 
By eliminating the need for MLA procedures, the CLOUD Act, e-
Evidence proposal, Budapest Convention, and the draft legal instrument 
for an International Data Access Warrant would increase the speed and 
efficiency of cross-border data access. The elimination of MLA 
proceedings, including domestic and foreign central authority scrutiny, as 
well as judicial approval for incoming U.S. requests, would dramatically 
simplify the process. Each legal instrument would provide an alternative 
 
 
169 Id. at art. 15(2)(c).  
170 Id. at art. 15(2)(a) (the committee is tentatively called the “Surveillance Legal Instrument 
Consultative Committee”).  
171 Id. at art. 15(2)(c)(v)(1), 15(2)(c)(iii), 15(2)(c)(v)(2).  
172 Id. at art. 15(2)(c)(v)(2); id. at art. 2(1) (Surveillance is defined in the instrument to include 
data collection.). 
173 Id. at art. 3–13. 
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to, or simply eliminate, foreign MLA requirements.175  These streamlined 
procedures would likely shave months off of response times, at least in the 
U.S.176 The e-Evidence proposal envisions a response time of ten days or 
less in non-emergency situations, in contrast to its current wait-time of one 
to six months.177  
Additionally, the overall reduction of OIA’s caseload would 
presumably shrink its backlog and reduce wait-times for states not party to, 
or beneficiaries of, these instruments. Caseloads in other states could be 
reduced further by the voluntary disclosure regime for subscriber data 
envisioned in the forthcoming protocol to the Budapest Convention.178  
 
2. Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality 
 
To varying degrees, these legal instruments would reduce the risk of 
violations of state sovereignty and conflicts of law through the removal of 
blocking provisions and application of comity analysis.  
Executive agreements made pursuant to the CLOUD Act would 
eliminate “blocking” provisions in the U.S. and parties to these 
agreements, allowing service providers to respond directly to foreign data 
requests.179 The uncompleted Second Additional Protocol to the Budapest 
Convention would adopt a similar scheme for subscriber data.180  
Additionally, pursuant to the CLOUD Act, a service provider may 
challenge a U.S. request if it would potentially create a conflict of law with 
a party to an executive agreement. In assessing the motion, the court would 
perform a comity analysis, which includes a presumption against 
extraterritoriality.181 The e-Evidence proposal contains a more inclusive 
mechanism to prevent conflicts of law. If a request potentially creates a 
conflict of law with any country (not only pre-approved countries), a 
service provider may challenge the request.182 Additionally, the 
government of the affected country would in certain circumstances have 
the opportunity to deny the request.183  
While reducing the chance of international discord, the CLOUD Act 
and e-Evidence proposal would not entirely prevent violations of state 
sovereignty through unapproved cross-border data access. Given service 
providers’ dynamic and global data storage practices, situations will 
inevitably arise in which a provider is ordered to produce data stored in a 
country that has not given consent through a CLOUD Act agreement or 
other legal instrument.184 The CLOUD Act’s comity analysis only follows 
from potential conflicts with parties to agreements, and the e-Evidence 
 
 
175 Id. at art. 15; 18 U.S.C. § 2523 (2018); 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(5) (1988); Draft Regulation, 
supra note 2, at art. 1. 
176 See infra Part II, Section (A).  
177 Draft Regulation, supra note 2, art. 9(1). 
178 Terms of Reference, supra note 2, at 3.  
179 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(5). 
180 Terms of Reference, supra note 2, at 3. 
181 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(2); Dodge, supra note 72. 
182 Draft Regulation, supra note 2, at art. 15–16. 
183 Id. at art. 15(6). 
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proposal’s conflict mechanism—while generous—does not entirely 
prevent unapproved access.185  
More troubling is the inevitability that this approach—a government 
empowering itself to compel data stored in any country through domestic 
(or EU) law—will be copied by governments likely to abuse that power. 
This could give rise to “a potentially dangerous and uncoordinated race to 
the bottom.”186  
It follows that violations of state sovereignty and conflicts of law 
would occur less frequently where an inclusive multilateral agreement 
creates prior consent for direct access by foreign governments, as well as a 
degree of legal uniformity among state parties. This is what the draft legal 
instrument for an International Data Access Warrant would accomplish. 
This legal instrument would impose a set of stringent minimum human 
rights standards in government surveillance, and state parties would agree 
to require service providers in their jurisdiction to comply with 
International Data Access Warrants.187  
 
3. Human Rights  
 
While both the CLOUD Act and e-Evidence proposal leave domestic 
and regional protections for U.S. and EU citizens more-or-less intact, both 
are likely to directly or indirectly result in weaker protections for people in 
other jurisdictions. In contrast, the draft International Data Access Warrant 
instrument has the potential to increase the strength of legal protections 
worldwide.  
As discussed above, executive agreements made pursuant to the 
CLOUD Act contain few concrete legal protections for non-U.S. persons 
whose data are obtained from U.S. companies.188 Rather than using the 
legislation as an opportunity to impose higher standards, the authors appear 
to simply have treated foreign human rights protections as a nuisance.  
Additionally, both the CLOUD Act and e-Evidence proposal empower 
U.S. and EU member state law enforcement agencies to demand data 
located anywhere in the world outside of the MLA process. This sets a bad 
precedent for states with weak protections in the context of government 
data collection.189 Governments in these states will likely copy the U.S. 
and EU approach, demanding data outside of the MLA process—thereby 
depriving their nationals of the protections afforded by foreign law and 
increasing the likelihood of human rights violations.190  
In contrast, the draft proposal for the International Data Access 
Warrant has the potential to reduce the risk of abuses of data collection 
 
 
185 18 U.S.C. § 2703(h)(ii); Draft Regulation, supra note 2, art. 15–16 (A conflict of law 
unrelated to fundamental rights, national security, or defense prompts a balancing test, rather than 
an absolute bar to data production.).  
186 Katitza Rodriguez, The U.S. CLOUD Act and the EU: A Privacy Protection Race to the Bottom, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/04/us-cloud-act-
and-eu-privacy-protection-race-bottom.  
187 See infra Part IV, Section (D).  
188 See infra Part IV, Section (A)(3). 
189 Rodriguez, supra note 186. 
190 Id. Compare this with the Russian government’s duplication of Germany’s Network 
Enforcement Act (“fake news law”), which is more ominous in the context of Russia’s weak 
human rights legal protections. See, e.g., Russian Bill is Copy-and-Paste of Germany’s Hate 








82 NOTRE DAME J. INT’L & COMP. L. vol. 9:2 
 
 
powers, while increasing the strength of related human rights protections 
around the world. Unlike the CLOUD Act’s slippery language, the myriad 
of human rights protections upon which ratification is conditioned are 
sufficiently specific and concrete to ensure that they are not interpreted in 
ways that render them meaningless.191 Additionally, the international 
judicial mechanism does not set a bad precedent for governments wishing 
to increase the scope of data collection powers for unsavory purposes. In 
fact, it requires states to relinquish power by narrowing the scope of 
permissible domestic and cross-border data collection.  
 
4. Summary  
 
The draft proposal for the International Data Access Warrant is the 
only instrument that would increase the speed and efficiency of cross-
border data access, have a high likelihood of preventing violations of state 
sovereignty and conflicts of law, and provide reliably strong human rights 
protections. From a legal perspective, it is ideal. However, from a political 
perspective, it is not. 
 
 
IV. NEGOTIATING THE INTERNATIONAL DATA ACCESS WARRANT 
PROPOSAL 
 
A. WHY IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT  
 
Given the usual challenges associated with the creation of international 
human rights treaties, and the degree to which states zealously guard their 
surveillance powers in particular, the draft International Data Access 
Warrant mechanism could be a hard sell. Yet its strengths merit the work 
necessary to bring it to fruition. The CLOUD Act and, if enacted, e-
Evidence proposal could create breathing room to allow the U.S., EU, and 
the rest of the international community to put a more sustainable solution 
in place.  
At a first glance, governments may understandably find the draft legal 
instrument unrealistic. The creation of international human rights 
instruments has never been an easy task.192 Negotiations are often long 
and—given the diversity of political views represented—contentious.193 
 
 
191 Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2523(b)(1)(B)(v) (2018) (creating an ambiguous “appropriate 
transparency” standard), with Draft Legal Instrument, supra note 2, at art. 4(2)(a)–(b) 
(enumerating procedures such as “[p]ublicly available, periodic reports allowing for a substantive 
and comprehensive review of the activities of relevant agencies to other State entities such as the 
legislative branch and/or the judicial branch” and “[p]ublicly available transparency reports by the 
State itself in respect to all requests made to corporations and other non-state actors with regard to 
the provision of personal data including categories, and frequency”). 
192 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001) (describing the negotiation process—in 
particular the friction between representatives of the then-Soviet Union and Western 
democracies—that gave rise to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and ultimately, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights); Elizabeth Sepper, Confronting the “Sacred and Unchangeable”: The 
Obligation to Modify Cultural Patterns Under the Women’s Discrimination Treaty, 30 U. PA. J. 
INT’L L. 585, 594 (2008) (describing the protracted and hotly-contested negotiations behind the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women).  
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These difficulties would be amplified in the context of a treaty concerning 
online privacy and surveillance. Whether legitimate or cynical, 
governments’ contemporary preoccupation with terrorism causes them to 
stubbornly hold onto what are arguably disproportionate and unlawful 
surveillance powers, and even call for expanded powers, in spite of 
intensive reform efforts and contrary court decisions.194 Additionally, 
MLAT reform is a time-sensitive issue, given OIA’s rapidly increasing 
case burden, as well as the need to prevent the spread of data localization 
and other problematic unilateral measures. 
 
B. WHY IT IS WORTHWHILE  
 
Nevertheless, the draft proposal warrants the effort it would take for 
the U.S., EU, and other governments to actualize it. It would provide an 
effective, long-term solution for speedy and lawful cross-border data 
access that would prevent human rights abuses. It would not trigger a “race 
to the bottom,” in which expansions of domestic power to access cross-
border data give rise to more conflicts of law, violations of state 
sovereignty, and weakened human rights protections worldwide. Human 
rights protections would be a cornerstone, rather than an afterthought. At a 
minimum, it would prevent the kinds of excesses and abuses seen in China, 
with effective limitations on both cross-border data access and purely 
domestic surveillance activities. Thus, governments should treat the 
CLOUD Act and e-Evidence proposal as stopgap solutions and follow the 
Special Rapporteur’s recommendation to start empowering their executive 
branches to “actively explore” the draft legal instrument and similar 
proposals.195  
Once committed, governments may find the process easier than 
expected. Governments worldwide would have a strong incentive to 
support the proposal, given their urgent need for more rapid access to 
cross-border data. Civil society would have a strong incentive to support 
the proposal, as it would satisfyingly address both human rights advocates’ 
concerns about online privacy and data protection and companies’ desire to 
avoid conflicts of law. Increasingly, privacy-conscious publics would 
likely be receptive to this scheme. The Special Rapporteur expects that the 
“number of states coalescing around newly-articulated principles and 
newly created mechanisms could gradually grow to provide critical mass . . 






That “[t]he natural tendency of Government is toward abuse of 
power,” was noted by a congressional oversight committee in its 1976 
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report about U.S. government surveillance.197 This is why “[c]lear legal 
standards and effective oversight and controls are necessary to ensure that 
domestic intelligence activity does not itself undermine the democratic 
system it is intended to protect.”198 The European Court of Human Rights 
came to a similar conclusion two years later, when it noted that a law 
affording a government unlimited discretion in domestic surveillance 
created a “danger . . . of undermining or even destroying democracy on the 
ground of defending it,” and therefore, required “adequate and effective 
guarantees against abuse.”199  
Consequently, the court and U.S. Congress mandated similar 
independent judicial (or “preferably judicial” in the court’s judgment) 
oversight requirements.200  
Some argue that the increased volume and importance of electronic 
evidence in contemporary law enforcement investigations necessitate 
weaker procedural protections for individuals, because of the burden high 
standards place on investigators. Yet if one bears in mind the purpose of 
these protections—preventing the abuse of power—the increased volume 
and importance of electronic communications in contemporary life, if 
anything, demands stronger protections. This makes clear—as opposed to 
ambiguous—legal standards and effective—as opposed to perfunctory and 
impotent—oversight and controls are as indispensable today as they were 
thirty years ago.  
For that reason, a legal instrument governing cross-border data access 
must prioritize human rights protections, rather than carelessly strip them 
away. The instrument must also accommodate the borderless nature of the 
Internet to avoid violations of state sovereignty and conflicts of law, while 
expediting the process. The draft International Data Access Warrant 
proposal would best accomplish these goals. 
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POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 287–89 (2017) (noting that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act, the creation of which was prompted by the Church Committee report, imposed a warrant 
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